Lydos Air provides a non-invasive drone monitoring stack for honeybee colony health, combining wingbeat acoustic vitality scoring with EPPO-coded entomovision Varroa mite detection and operator pollen traffic observation. Assessment outputs are structured for veterinary and apiculturist consumption — the engine does not diagnose, it produces chain-hashed, KSL-signed records for professional review. Türkiye hosts one of the world's largest managed honeybee populations and the Mediterranean Apis mellifera subspecies complex; the platform was validated against this operational context, where timely Varroa and Nosema signalling is critical to winter survival rates.
MB-00
Mission Scenarios
MB-AP-01Mission Brief
REV A
Wingbeat Acoustic Colony Assessment
A 40 kHz MEMS microphone records the acoustic signature above the hive entrance. The operator-extracted dominant frequency is matched against the KSL-signed species library — Apis mellifera at 230 Hz, Bombus terrestris at 150 Hz — using bandwidth-aware linear-decay confidence mathematics. A declining Apis mellifera intensity is one of four inputs to the colony vitality score, enabling non-invasive health inference without disturbing the brood.
Drone-mounted EPPO-coded entomovision engine classifies Varroa destructor (VARRDE) presence from high-resolution canopy-adjacent imagery of drone brood cells. The detection rate feeds the threat_load formula with a 0.50 weight — the single highest-weighted threat signal. When varrde_detection_rate >= 0.50 AND threat_load >= 0.50, the assessment is marked as FPTN bridge-eligible for federation to the M219 Pollinator Threat Network.
The platform records operator-observed pollen traffic counts at the hive entrance across a standardised observation window. Pollen traffic index contributes 0.25 weight to the colony vitality score — second-highest among the four vitality inputs. A low pollen traffic index in combination with a declining wingbeat Apis intensity is a composite early-warning signal for colony decline that can be detected without hive opening.
Operational Flow
Operator Observe→Standardise Count→Normalise to [0,1]→Persist Record→Vitality Score Feed
MB-AP-04Mission Brief
REV A
Federated Apiary Threat Network
FPTN bridge-eligible assessments — those with varrde_detection_rate >= 0.50 AND threat_load >= 0.50 — are queued for operator-authorised publication to the M219 Pollinator Threat Network. Each shared signal carries only hashed apiary identifiers, broad region prefix, threat_load, and varrde_rate — no GPS coordinates, no operator email, no raw inspection data. Operator decides to publish; auto-publish is intentionally not implemented (loose coupling, KURAL 19).
The European Plant Protection Organisation's open Bayer-code taxonomy is the single source of truth for species identifiers across the entomovision and wingbeat engines. VARRDE (Varroa destructor), AETHTU (Aethina tumida), APISME (Apis mellifera), and BOMBTR (Bombus terrestris) are EPPO codes — globally unambiguous and regulatory-grade across EU member states and candidate countries including Türkiye.
ACTIVE
COMP-AP-02
OIE Bee Health Surveillance Framework
The World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH/OIE) Terrestrial Animal Health Code includes honey bee health surveillance guidelines for Varroa destructor, Aethina tumida, and Nosema spp. The platform's threat_load formula weights and the FPTN eligibility threshold are designed to flag colony assessments that fall within OIE-relevant risk ranges, providing structured data for veterinary handoff — the engine does not replace veterinary diagnosis.
ACTIVE
COMP-AP-03
EU Honey Directive 2001/110/EC traceability context
EU Directive 2001/110/EC and its 2014 amending Directive 2014/63/EU establish traceability and quality requirements for honey placed on the EU market. The platform's chain-hashed apiary assessment ledger and hashed apiary identifier scheme provide a structural audit trail aligned with traceability expectations — supporting documentation for third-party audits without exposing raw operator location data.
ACTIVE
COMP-AP-04
NIST FIPS 180-4 SHA-256 hash chain audit
Every colony assessment record, FPTN bundle signal, and KSL-signed command across the Apian-Veterinary Bridge uses SHA-256 per NIST FIPS 180-4 for chain-hash construction. Apiary and hive identifiers are stored as sha256 hashes — raw location coordinates never enter the relational schema. This structural constraint is enforced at the data layer and verified by test invariants on every CI run.
ACTIVE
FAQ-00
Sector Questions
FAQ-01
How does the platform detect Varroa destructor without inspecting hives?
The entomovision engine runs an ONNX-format vision model on drone imagery taken during a low-altitude sweep above drone brood cells at the hive exterior. The model classifies visible mite presence against the VARRDE EPPO Bayer code and reports a detection rate. This is a non-invasive screening signal — it does not replace a full brood inspection by a trained apiculturist or veterinarian. The platform explicitly labels its output as an assessment for veterinary consumption, not a veterinary diagnosis.
FAQ-02
What veterinary information leaves the apiary network?
The FPTN bridge bundle shares only four fields per eligible signal: a sha256-hashed apiary identifier, a sha256-hashed hive identifier, the computed threat_load value, and the varrde_detection_rate. No GPS coordinates, no operator name or email, no raw inspection notes, and no imagery are published. The broad region prefix used in the Pollinator Threat Network follows the same 29-region allow-list used across all federated engines — no finer geographic resolution. The operator must explicitly authorise publication; there is no automatic push.
FAQ-03
Can a beekeeper opt out of the federated bridge?
Yes. Federation to the M219 Pollinator Threat Network is never automatic. A local assessment being marked as FPTN bridge-eligible means it meets the threat threshold and the signals are ready — it does not trigger any publication. The operator must review the 72-hour bundle and explicitly authorise the push. If a beekeeper does not authorise, the data remains local. The loose-coupling design (KURAL 19) ensures the AVB engine has no internal auto-publish path.