Quantum Mission Lineage
Post-Quantum KSL Fingerprint Chain
As quantum computing advances, ECDSA-signed mission logs become retroactively forgeable. The Quantum Mission Lineage engine (KCML, M217) replaces classical signatures with NIST FIPS 204 ML-DSA (Dilithium) across the entire KSL command chain — mission authorisations, audit records, and ASR evidence — so that every lineage record is quantum-safe at rest and in transit.
Capability specification
- 01
NIST FIPS 204 ML-DSA (Dilithium) signature on every KSL command
- 02
Post-quantum audit fingerprint chain: each record includes the hash of its predecessor
- 03
ASR (Autonomous Security Response) wiring for ML-DSA evidence propagation
- 04
Hybrid classical + post-quantum key registration with per-device key sovereignty
- 05
Fail-closed: unsigned or classically-signed commands rejected when PQ mode is active
- 06
44-test green suite covering key lifecycle, chain integrity, and ASR forwarding
How it works
Key Registration
Operator registers a device-bound ML-DSA key pair via the KSL endpoint. The public key is stored; the private key never leaves the originating device.
Command Signing
Every mission command is signed with the ML-DSA private key before submission. The platform verifies the signature against the registered public key and rejects any request that fails verification.
Chain Anchoring
Each accepted command is written to the audit ledger with a SHA-256 chain hash linking it to the prior record. The chain is forwarded to the ASR evidence layer for autonomous defence correlation.
Standards we follow
- STD-01
NIST FIPS 204 — Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard (ML-DSA / Dilithium)
- STD-02
NIST FIPS 180-4 — Secure Hash Standard (SHA-256 chain hash)
Areas served
This capability is deployed across 14 operational regions. Regulatory alignment details vary by jurisdiction — consult engineering for jurisdiction-specific deployment guidance.
Frequently asked questions
Why does post-quantum signing matter for drone operations today?
Harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks allow an adversary to record signed mission logs today and forge or repudiate them once a sufficiently capable quantum computer exists. ML-DSA signatures are secure against such attacks because they rely on module lattice hardness rather than integer factorisation or discrete logarithm problems that quantum algorithms can efficiently solve.
Does switching to ML-DSA require replacing existing hardware?
No. The KCML engine runs in software on the existing platform. Key pairs are generated and stored on the operator device; the platform stores only public keys. The private key never enters the server, consistent with the KSL device-sovereignty model across all other engines.
Talk to engineering
For capability evaluation, integration guidance, and deployment scoping, submit a brief to the engineering team.
Submit engineering brief